Administrative Notice of California law applicable to government waiver of sovereignty.
Official Notice Requested (West's Ann.Cal.Gov. Code (2004), § 11515)
JUDICIAL NOTICE REQUIRED (West's Ann.Cal.Evid. Code (2004), §§ 451, 453, 459).
Declarant is a competent witness over the age of 18 years, has personal knowledge of the stated facts, and does Solemnly state that:
1.a. I am a natural born, adult white Woman, one of the People of the constitutional Republic, the United States of America, and one of the People of the California Republic created under the Constitution of 1849.
1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney. I do not "represent" myself; of necessity, I am acting at all times within my fundamental right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (2004), Art. 1, Sec. 1 (from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov./.const/.article_1 [as of April 23, 2004]):
All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
2. I rely upon the same materials as are available to attorneys and the court at or through the local law library. I present the results of my research concerning the status of California government here.
3. The "GENERAL INTRODUCTION", by Charles J. Williams, in West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), Vol. 1. pp. XLIII-XLV, reads (in part):
A bill to enact the Uniform Commercial Code in California was introduced in the California Legislature first in 1951 and subsequently at each regular session of the Legislature in the years 1953, 1955 and 1957.
In 1960 the California Commission on Uniform State Laws started a drive for the adoption of the Code at the 1961 Session. ...
...
In 1962, New York adopted its version of the Code....
In August, 1962, Senate Preprint No. 7 was prepared for introduction at the 1963 legislative session....
At the 1963 Legislative Session, Senate Bill No. 118 was introduced. This bill as introduced was adopted with one minor amendment as Chapter 819, Statutes of 1963.
4. Stats. 1963, ch. 819, p. 1849 reads (in part):
An act to establish a Commercial Code, thereby consolidating and revising the law relating to certain commercial transactions in or regarding personal property and contracts and other documents concerning them, including sales, commercial paper, bank deposts and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, other documents of title, investment securities, and secured transactions, including certain sales of accounts, chattel paper, and contract rights; providing for public notice to third parties in certain circumstances; regulating procedure, evidence and damages in certain court actions involving such transactions, contracts or documents; to make uniform the law with respect thereto; amending certain sections of the Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, Corporations Code, Financial Code and Vehicle Code, to make them consistent therewith; adding Chapter 12.5 (commencing with Section 560) to Title 13 of Part 1 of the Penal Code, relating to crimes involving bailments; and repealing legislation inconsistent therewith.
[Approved by Governor June 8, 1963. Filed with Secretary of State June 8, 1963.]
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. The Commercial Code is enacted, to read: . . .
5. Santa Clara Lawyer, V. 5, No. 1, p. 81-82 (Fall 1964), "Governmental Liability for Torts of Employees - The End of Sovereign Immunity in California", James V. Arnold, reads (in part, footnotes are partially reproduced interlineally in square brackets, emphasis added):
In 1963 the California Legislature enacted the first general law dealing with the liability of governmental entities for the torts of their employees. [1 CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 810-895.8] ... It is the purpose of this article to examine those provisions of the 1963 enactment which bring to an end the doctrine of sovereign immunity in California. [4 Other bills passed in Stats. 1963 include: Chapter{s} 1715 ... 1682 ... 1683 ... 1684].
The California Supreme Court decided two cases early in 1961 which evoked an immediate reaction from the California Legislature. In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District [5 55 Cal.2d 211...] the court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would no longer protect public entities from civil liability for their torts. ...Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District [6 55 Cal.2d 224...] stated that the doctrine of discretionary immunity, which protects public employees from liability for their discretionary acts, might not protect public entities from liability in all situations where the employees are immune. The Legislature reacted at once, passing Chapter 1404 of the Statutes of 1961, which suspended the effect of these decisions until the ninety-first day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Legislature. For the next two years the California Law Revision Commission studied the problem of sovereign immunity. It submitted proposals to the 1963 session of the Legislature, most of which were enacted into law with minor changes. [7 4 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep., Rec. & Studies Report, at 219-222 (1963).] ...
6.a. Within six weeks after the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the California Legislature adopted Stats. 1963, Chapters 1682, 1683, 1684, and 1715, which, when read together, seem to grant sovereign immunity to the public entities the statutes create.
6.b. Stats. 1963, Ch. 1681, p., entitled (in part, emphasis added), "An act to add Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810 to Title 1 of the Government Code, ... relating to liability of public entities and public officers, servants, and employees." [Approved by Governor July 15, 1963. Filed with Secretary of State July 17, 1963.] reads (in part, emphasis added):
SECTION 1. Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810) is added to Title 1 of the Government Code, to read:
810. Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, the definitions contained in this part govern the construction of this division.
810.2. "Employee" includes an officer, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor.
...
811.2. "Public entity" includes the State, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.
811.4. "Public employee" means an employee of a public entity.
...
811.8. "Statute" means an act adopted by the Legislature of this State or by the Congress of the United States or a statewide initiative act.
...
814. Nothing in this part affects liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than money or damages against a public entity or public employee.
...
815. Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
(b) The liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.
...
815.6. Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
6.c. Stats. 1963, Ch. 1715, p. 3369, is entitled (in part), "An act to add Part 3 (commencing with Section 900), Part 4 (commencing with Section 940) and Part 5 (commencing with Section 965), to Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code as enacted by Senate Bill No. 42 of the 1963 Regular Session, ... relating to claims, actions and judgments against public entities and public officers, employees, and servants." and reads (in part):
SECTION 1. Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) is added to Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code as enacted by Senate Bill No. 42 of the 1963 Regular Session, to read (in part):
. . .
CHAPTER 2. ACTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC ENTITIES
945. A public entity may sue and be sued.
7.a.1. The Supreme Court of California has held:
12 Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 states that the writ may be issued to any "inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person." While it has been said that counties are not municipal corporations but are political subdivisions of the state for purposes of government (County of Marin v. Superior Court (1960) 53 Cal.2d 633, 638-639, [2 Cal.Rptr. 758, 349 P.2d 526]; County of Los Angeles v. Riley (1936) 6 Cal.2d 625, 627-628 [59 P.2d 139, 106 A.L.R. 903]; County of San Mateo v. Coburn (1900) 130 Cal. 631, 636-637 [63 P. 78, 621]; Pritchess v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 653, 656-657 [83 Cal.Rptr. 41], counties have also been declared public corporations or quasi-corporations. (Pritchess v. Superior Court, supra; Whelan v. Bailey (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 334, 339 [36 P.2d 709], overruled on other grounds in Estate of Miller (1936) 5 Cal.2d 588, 591 [55 P.2d 491]; Smith v. Myers (1860) 15 Cal. 33, 34; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) § 2.46, pp. 496-497.) In view of Government Code section 23003, which provides that a county is "a body corporate and public," and section 23004, subdivision (a) of the same code, which states that counties may sue and be sued, we think that a county is sufficiently corporate in character to justify the issuance of a writ of mandate to it.
People ex rel Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971), 5 Cal.3d 480, 491, fnt 12, 96 Cal.Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193.
7.a.2. The Supreme Court of the United States held:
We do not lightly reject the Court of Appeals' previous conclusion that California counties are merely part of the State itself and as such are not citizens of the State for diversity purposes.[fnt 54] But in light of both the highest state court's recent determination of the corporate character of counties and our own examination of relevant California law, we must conclude that this County has a sufficiently corporate character to dictate that it be treated as a citizen of California under our decision in Cowles v Mercer County, supra.
Thus, we hold that petitioner Moor's state law claim against the County is within diversity jurisdiction.
Moor v. County of Alameda (1973) 411 U.S. 693, 36 L.Ed.2d 596, 616, 93 S.Ct. 1785.
8.a.1. The Supreme Court of the United States has further held (emphasis added):
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transaction of that company of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union who have an interest in banks, are not suable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The state of Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives all the privileges of that character. As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation, than are expressly given by the incorporating act.
The government of the Union held shares in the old Bank of the United States; but the privileges of the government were not imported by that circumstance to the bank. The United States was not a party to suits brought by or against the bank in the sense of the constitution. So with respect to the present bank. Suits brought by or against it are not understood to be brought by or against the United States. The government, by becoming a corporator, lays down its sovereignty, so far as respects the transactions of the corporation, and exercises no power or privilege which is not derived from the charter.
The Bank of the United States v. The Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907-908, 6 L.Ed. 244.
8.a.2.
The governmental-proprietary distinction [26. In actuality, the distinction between a municipality's governmental and proprietary functions is better characterized not as a line, but as a succession of points. In efforts to avoid the often-harsh results occasioned by a literal application of the test, courts frequently created highly artificial and elusive distinctions of their own. The result was that the very same activity might be considered "governmental" in one jurisdiction, and "proprietary" in another. See 18 McQuillin § 53.02, at 105. See also W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 131, p 979 (4th ed 1971)(hereinafter Prosser). As this Court stated, in reference to the "'nongovernmental'-'governmental' quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations":

"A comparative study of the cases in the forty-eight States will disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound." Indian Towing Co. v United States, 350 US 61, 65, 100 L Ed 48, 76 S Ct 122 (1955)(on rehearing).] owed its existence to the dual nature of the municipal corporation. On the one hand, the municipality was a corporate body, capable of performing the same "proprietary" functions as any private corporation, and liable for its torts in the same manner and to the same extent, as well. On the other hand, the municipality was an arm of the State, and when acting in that "governmental" or "public" capacity, it shared the immunity traditionally accorded the sovereign. [27. "While acting in their governmental capacity, municipal corporations proper are given the benefit of the same rule which is applied to the sovereign power itself, and are afforded complete immunity from civil responsibility for acts done or omitted, unless such responsibility is expressly created by statute. When, however, they are not acting in the exercise of their purely governmental functions, but are performing duties that pertain to the exercise of those private franchises, powers, and privileges which belong to them for their own corporate gain or emolument, then a different rule of liability is applied and they are generally held responsible for injuries arising from their negligent acts or their omissions to the same extent as a private corporation under like circumstances." Williams § 4, p 9. See generally 18 McQuillin §§ 53.02, 53.04, 53.24; Prosser § 131, pp 977-983; James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U Chi L Rev 610, 611-612, 622-629 (1955).]
But the principle of sovereign immunity--itself a somewhat arid fountainhead for municipal immunity [28. Although it has never been understood how the doctrine of sovereign immunity came to be adopted in the American democracy, it apparently stems from the personal immunity of the English Monarch as expressed in the maxim, "The King can do no wrong." It has been suggested, however, that the meaning traditionally ascribed to this phrase is an ironic perversion of its original intent: "The maxim merely meant the the King was not privileged to do wrong. If his acts were against the law, they were injurae (wrongs). Bracton, while ambiguous in his several statements as to the relation between the King and the law, did not intend to convey the idea that he was incapable of committing a legal wrong." Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 Yale LJ 1, 2, n 2 (1924). See also Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S Cal L Rev 131, 142 (1972).
In this country, "[t]he sovereign or governmental immunity doctrine, holding that the state, its subdivisions and municipal entities, may not be held liable for tortious acts, was never completely accepted by the courts, its underlying principle being deemed contrary to the basic concept of the law of torts that liability follows negligence, as well as foreign to the spirit of the constitutional guarantee that every person is entitled to a legal remedy for injuries he may receive in his person or property. As a result, the trend of judicial decisions was always to restrict, rather than to expand, the doctrine of municipal immunity." 18 McQuillin § 53.02, p 104 (footnotes omitted). See also Prosser § 131, p 984 ("For well over a century the immunity of both the state and local governments for their torts has been subjected to vigorous criticism, which at length has begun to have its effect."). The seminal opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So 2d 130 (1957), has spawned "a minor avalanche of decisions repudiating municipal immunity," Prosser § 131 p 985, which, in conjunction with legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity, has resulted in the consequence that only a handful of States still cling to the old common-law rule of immunity for governmental functions); Harley & Wasinger, Government Immunity: Despotic Mantle or Creature of Necessity, 16 Washburn LJ 12, 34-53 (1976).]--is necessarily nullified when the State expressly or impliedly allows itself, or its creation, to be sued. Municipalities were therefore liable not only for their "proprietary" acts, but also for those "governmental" functions as to which the State had withdrawn their immunity.
Owen v. City of Independence, (1980), 445 U.S. 622, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, 689-690, 100 S.Ct. 1398.
8.b. I Shepardized The Bank of the United States in Shepard's United States Citations, Case Edition, 1994 and its Supplements and it is still a valid case through the Cumulative Supplement, May 1, 2004.
9. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has held:
[fnt] 8. The distinction between government acting in its proprietary and its sovereign capacities is well settled in the law, although it has not escaped criticism. E.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644 & n.26, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1412 & n.26, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). As far back as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself....
Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 904, 907, 6. L.Ed. 244 (1824) See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-696, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 1861-1862, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976) (Opinion of White, J.)(collecting citations).
This court has relied on the distinction while recognizing its limitations. See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 100 & n.17 (9th Cir. 1970)
United States v. Regner (9th Cir. 1982), 677 F.2d 754, 763 fnt 8., cert den. 459 U.S. 911, 74 L.Ed.2d 175, 103 S.Ct. 220.
10. A California appellate court held (emphasis added):
Another case, that of Marin Water Dist. v. Marin Water Co., 178 Cal. 308 [173 Pac. 469, 471], demonstrates that California at least, has departed from the rule laid down by the celebrated Marshall in the case of Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 904, [6 L. Ed. 244, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes], to the effect that when a government enters into business instead of communicating to the business any of its privileges and prerogatives, it descends to a level of the business in which it engages. In the California case, under the authority of a constitutional provision, it is held that a water district formed for the purpose of supplying its inhabitants with water has the right to condemn the property of a privately owned public utility theretofore engaged in the business of supplying water to the same people and that the enactment did not violate the provision of "the federal constitution prohibiting a state from depriving a person of his property without due process of law, or denying him the equal protection of the laws." The provision of the state Constitution to which we have referred is section 23a of article XII and reads as follows:
"The Railroad Commission shall have and exercise such power and jurisdiction as shall be conferred upon it by the legislature to fix the just compensation to be paid for the taking of any property of a public utility in eminent domain proceeding by the state or any county, city and county, incorporated city or town, municipal water district, irrigation district or other public corporation or district, and the right of the legistature to confer such powers upon the Railroad Commission is hereby declared to be plenary and to be unlimited by any provision of this Constitution. All acts of the legislature heretofore adopted which are in accordance herewith are hereby confirmed and declared valid."
Los Angeles v. South Gate (1930), 108 Cal.App. 398, 410.
11. I reasonably infer that in 1963 the California Legislature knowingly created an entire second "State", with all its included "public entities", intentionally launched that collection of "public entities" into commerce, and thereby knowingly waived the sovereignty and the sovereign immunity of each and every such "public entity".
I certify within the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true, complete, and accurate.
Signed: __________________________________________________
Dated: ________________________________________
at: ___________________________________________
END

The corresponding sections of West's Ann.Cal. Gov. Code (2002) read (in part):
a. § 810. Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, the definitions contained in this part govern the construction of this division.
b.1. § 810.2. "Employee" includes an officer, judicial officer as defined in Section 327 of the Elections Code, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor.
b.2. West's Ann.Cal. Elec. Code (2002), § 327 reads:
§ 327. Judicial officer means any Justice of the Supreme Court, justice of a court of appeal, judge of the superior court, or judge of a municipal court.
c.1. § 811.2. "Public entity" includes the State, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.
c.2. West's Ann.Cal. Gov. Code (2002), § 18 reads:
§ 18. "State" means the State of California, unless applied to the different parts of the United States. In the latter case, it includes the District of Columbia and the territories.
d. § 811.4. "Public employee" means an employee of a public entity.
e. § 811.8. "Statute" means an act adopted by the Legislature of this State or by the Congress of the United States or a statewide initiative act.
f. § 811.9 [nt: Added Stats. 2000, ch. 447, § 4.5]. Judges, subordinant judicial officers, and court executive officers; superior and municipal courts; state officer status
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, judges, subordinant judicial officers, and court executive officers of the superior and municipal courts are state officers for purposes of Part 1 (commencing with Section 810) to Part 7 (commencing with Section 995), inclusive, and trial court employees are employees of the trial court for purposes of Part 1 (commencing with Section 810) to Part 7 (commencing with Section 995), inclusive. The Judicial Council shall provide for representation, defense, and indemnification of such individuals and the court pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 810) to Part 7 (commencing with Section 995), inclusive. The Judicial Council shall provide for such representation or defense through the county counsel, the Attorney General,, or other counsel. The county counsel and the Attorney General may, but are not required to, provide such representation or defense for the Judicial Council. The fact that a judge, subordinant judicial officer, court executive officer, trial court employee, or the court was represented or defended by the county counsel, the Attorney General, or other counsel shall not be the sole basis for a judicial determination of disqualification of a judge, subordinant judicial officer, the county counsel, the Attorney General, or other counsel in unrelated actions.
g. § 815. Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.
(b) The liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.
h. § 945. A public entity may sue and be sued.

To make this easy for you, This “State Of California” is a federal instrumentality of the corporate federal government [U.S. inc. ] and is functioning under federal municipal law within it’s borders. The UCC, law of contract, Law Merchant, imposed under Martial Law Rule in 1933 by virtue of the Bankruptcy. It is used to rape, pillage and plunder the people of California and the people of all the once sovereign several states of the Union, formed under organic American Common Law by the people. The people were sovereign when they had land and money of substance.
The federal government was subservient to the states. The federal government transferred the sovereignty from the people to themselves when we went bankrupt. The federal government took everything from the people and they began to live in financial peonage. [slaves to the IMF]
The California Republic still exists. It’s lying, unused, underneath the Federal “State within a State” and waiting for courageous Americans to bring it back to life.