Mit einem Durchbruch bei den Verhandlungen zwischen der EU und China über ein Investitionsabkommen rechnet das Auswärtige Amt nicht. „China müsste noch weitreichende Zugeständnisse machen“, kritisierte Annen. „In Kernbereichen der Verhandlungen sind wir bislang zu wenig vorangekommen.“ Der SPD-Politiker rechtfertigte auch die Haltung des Außenministeriums, wonach chinesische Technologiekonzerne wie Huawei in Deutschland nicht als Ausrüster kritischer Infrastrukturen, etwa dem 5G-Netz, infrage kommen sollten.

„Ich glaube, dass wir die Argumente aus Washington gegenüber Huawei sehr, sehr ernst nehmen sollten“, sagte er. Es gebe zudem „ein wohlbegründetes Misstrauen gegenüber Chinas Umgang mit Big Data. Wir sehen ja, wie digitale Technologien in China und darüber hinaus zur Überwachung angewendet werden“, mahnte Annen.

Zugleich wandte sich der Staatsminister gegen die konfrontative Chinapolitik der USA. „Ich spreche mich auch gegen eine Dämonisierung von China aus“, betonte er. Die Sprache sei in der Diplomatie ein wichtiges Instrument, vielleicht sogar das wichtigste.

Man müsse im Dialog bleiben. Annen warnte vor Bestrebungen, den westlichen Wirtschaftsraum vom chinesischen abzukoppeln: Dies „würde eine völlig neue Logik in den Wirtschaftsbeziehungen einleiten, es wäre eine neue Form des Protektionismus: konkurrierende, sich gegenseitig ausschließende Systeme“.

Diese Entwicklung sei bereits im Gange. Annen sagte, er fühle sich teils an den Kalten Krieg erinnert: „Das ist nicht im Interesse eines Landes wie Deutschland, dessen Wirtschaftsmodell auf freiem Welthandel beruht.“

Lesen Sie hier das gesamte Interview: 

Herr Annen, das Gebaren Chinas trifft in Europa zunehmend auf Gegenwehr. Woran liegt das?
Das Chinabild der Europäer wandelt sich. Es hat sich gelohnt, dass wir uns in Vorbereitung auf die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft eng mit unseren Partnern abgestimmt haben. Auf seiner Europareise vergangene Woche hat der chinesische Außenminister Wang Yi in zentr... dieselben Botschaften gehört. Ich könnte mir vorstellen, dass es darüber in Peking jetzt eine Diskussion gibt. Wir sehen eben doch eine ganze Reihe von Entwicklungen, die man nicht ignorieren kann. 

Was macht Ihnen besonders Sorgen?
Da ist die Menschenrechtslage, insbesondere gegenüber ethnischen Minderheiten wie den Uiguren in Xinjiang, da ist das Sicherheitsgesetz in Hongkong. Wir haben erlebt, wie die Chinesen im Schatten der Corona-Pandemie Militärmanöver im südchinesischen Meer in ungewohnter Intensität stattfinden ließen. Wegen solcher Entwicklungen erleben wir eine Neuorientierung in Europa. Es gibt aber auch den Willen, mit China im Dialog zu bleiben. Auch das hat Wangs Reise gezeigt. Also: klare Haltung, wenn es um Grundüberzeugungen der Europäer geht. Zugleich die Bereitschaft, mit China weiter zusammenzuarbeiten. Wir wollen eine Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe. 

But where are the results? Hasn't the hope of negotiating an investment agreement between Europe and China long since been dashed? China would still have to make far-reaching concessions. We have not made enough progress in key areas of the negotiations so far. However, the fact that the videoconference is taking place also shows a difference in European and American foreign policy. We have been seeing massive political attacks on Beijing from Washington for months. There is a real campaign with coordinated speeches by senior US officials. The rhetoric is almost reminiscent of the Cold War.

Are the Americans not right to denounce grievances in China? German politics shares many of the criticisms at its core. I do not want to mince words: I am very concerned, for example, about the reports from Xinjiang. What goes out from there is shocking. However, we have our own sovereign European approach. A new global confrontation cannot be in our interest. That is why it is important to keep the channels of conversation open.

Niels Annen

"Probably Xi is the most powerful president since state founder Mao."

(Photo: imago images/Metodi Popow)

Also for alibi events such as the human rights dialogue? I know this criticism and I do not share it. I can say that I do not know many countries that, like the Federal Republic, raise human rights issues at every high-level opportunity. If we in Europe could agree on a more uniform line on human rights issues, we would be heard much more strongly in Beijing.

However, China policy in particular is still predominantly pronounced at national level, including in Germany. Of course, there are also bilateral issues that each EU country pursues at national level. However, on all major issues – including transparency and market principles, the rule of law and human rights – we share common European interests and values. We are the most successful way to pursue these together. At our initiative, we have also succeeded in adopting a common EU line in response to the National Security Act in Hong Kong. When individual states come under pressure, such as the Czech Republic, we must show that we do not allow ourselves to be divided.

More than a dozen EU countries have signed separate memorandums of understanding with China on the new Silk Road project. This is not a show of unity, but of division. We are not happy about it, but there is no reason to panic. What we are hearing is that in many countries, people are now looking very soberly at the Chinese Silk Road Initiative. Many promises are not being fulfilled. In this respect, we have the opportunity to move closer together. Otherwise, we run the risk of under-ploughing our interests.

Would Europe send the right signal if it were to reward china, which is breaking standards, with an investment agreement? Our aim is to enable European companies in China to access the same market and investment conditions that Chinese companies in Europe receive. And, for all the criticism of China, we should acknowledge the enormous achievement of getting 400 to 500 million people out of poverty. There is no precedent for this in world history. But it is also true that the policy of restraint under Deng Xiaoping, who has put economic rise at the center and put territorial, political conflicts behind us– seems to be over for good under Xi Jinping.

The dictatorship has consolidated its power. We are experiencing a concentration of power. It is not, of course, that China was democratic before Xi, but there was some form of collective leadership. Xi is probably the most powerful president since Mao was the founder of the state. From the outside, it is sometimes difficult to judge how stable the regime actually is.

The Americans see the conflict with China as an ideological confrontation. Rightly so? Whether the Chinese leadership really pursues a Marxist-Leninist ideology, as is being spread by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, I have my doubts. Many years ago, I was able to follow discussions in the party school of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. I was not impressed by the level of discussion. I think as a learned Stamokap-Juso I knew much more about Marxism than many of the party cadres present (laughs).

If that's What Pompeo knew ... China is certainly an example of how an authoritarian state with great innovation potential and growing economic strength is challenging values that we consider essential. The confrontation with China is of world-historical importance, which is not an exaggeration. It is a question of whether we succeed in defending our own convictions without throwing the world into a new cold war. That is why I am also opposed to the demonisation of China: language is already an important instrument in diplomacy, perhaps even the most important. So we are holding on to the point that there is no containment, no decoupling, like the United States. But what then?
Let me first point out what it would mean to build two completely separate, interdependent political and economic blocs. It would introduce a completely new logic in economic relations, it would be a new form of protectionism: competing, mutually exclusive systems. We can see that this is the way forward. This is not in the interests of a country like Germany, whose economic model is based on free world trade. Decoupling cannot be our strategy.

On the other hand, the dogma of change has been overtaken by trade. There was a period in the West's China policy when there was too much belief that economic liberalization would automatically lead to political freedom. That has not been confirmed, quite the contrary. But I would like to warn that we are looking at China like a shock stare and have the impression that we cannot help ourselves other than resort to Cold War concepts.

But? We say: more meetings, more commitment, in China, but above all with the neighbours in the region. This strategy was presented by the Federal Government with the Indo-Pacific Guidelines. We are not targeting China, but we want to diversify our relations. We want to be more active in the region in order to protect and strengthen our interests, principles and values. We see this, for example, in the intensity of relations with Vietnam or in Singapore's great interest in cooperation.

There is a lot of controversy in the cabinet about the Supply Supply Supply Act: it is intended to encourage companies to pay attention to human rights protections for their foreign business partners as well. If this law comes as the SPD demands, wouldn't it mean the start of decoupling? First of all, I very much hope that we can enforce this law against the opposition of the CDU. Decoupling is not the goal. However, Chinese suppliers must comply with certain rules and guarantees.

The Americans want to rid Western data networks of Chinese technology. Beijing is now countering with a "Data Security Initiative" and offering itself to Europeans as a partner in the fight for data protection. Do you take this proposal seriously? We should look at it. But there is a well-founded distrust of China's handling of big data. We are seeing how digital technologies are being used for surveillance in China and beyond. We are fully aware that part of geopolitics today is being fought over the control and standardisation of new technologies. Overall, we would be much better off if we not only coordinated our China policy more closely in Europe, but also coordinated such steps more closely with the US side.

What significance does the US election have for German China policy? Democrats are also very critical of China. There is also a contest in the election campaign over who is tougher on Beijing. I therefore do not expect to say goodbye to a policy of confrontation. But I would like us to intensify the transatlantic dialogue on China. We see that the renunciation of acting as a West, or even thinking in this category, weakens us.

But do the Americans expect Germany to move – and exclude Chinese technology providers from the German 5G network? The vote within the Federal Government is ongoing. I have been sufficiently critical of the style of American China policy. But I believe that we should take the arguments from Washington against Huawei very, very seriously.

Mr Annen, thank you very much for the interview.

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