300 miles behind the main attack fleet, Admiral Yamamoto met with his staff at midnight prior to the battle of Midway, reassuring his commanders that all plans were well coordinated and there was nothing to fear. Meanwhile the picket of Imperial Navy submarines situated to detect any Pacific fleet carriers had failed to spot the incoming Pacific Fleet carrier force that would wait to strike from northeast of Midway. The Japanese were dead set on the idea that all known American carriers were at Pearl Harbor and the Midway garrison would be caught off guard.

It would take the admission of Mitsui Fujita, the squadron leader who had spearheaded the Pearl Harbor attack and was once again leading the aerial assault on Midway to admit in his autobiography on the Japanese defeat at Midway that Japanese command never considered that the Americans would be waiting on the other side of Midway Island ready to pounce if the Imperial Japanese carrier fleet attempted a landing operation there. In his 1955 book entitled “Midway the Battle that Doomed Japan,” Flight Commander at the time, Mitsui Fujita, revealed that high command under Admiral Yamamoto, were too myopic in their over confident planning and had trusted faulty intelligence on the whereabouts of the CINCPAC aircraft carriers!

From the very beginning of the planned invasion back in Japan, Yamamoto had sold his operation to the rest of the Imperial Japanese military as a solid way to work toward finalizing the Japanese stronghold on the Pacific. There were leaders of the Imperial Japanese army though, who disagreed, saying that the operation was too complicated and that even if they did capture and secure Midway Island, the distance to supply the island and vulnerability to the US submarine force would make Midway an unsuitable outpost. Never the less, Emperor Hiro Hito signed off on the massive naval offensive, and operation to capture Midway would be a foregone conclusion.

Just before Japanese carrier operations began their launches there were troubling signs. Japanese radio signal detection stations had picked up increased US Naval radio traffic which indicated a large US Naval move of undetermined intention. At first, they thought it was simply disconnected destroyer and supply ship chatter. The US Navy had even tried putting up intense faked radio transmissions to fool the Japanese in the past, but there was something much more sinister about the communications going on between the US Naval fleet and Midway channels. Still, major command adhered to the belief that the US Carriers remained at Pearl Harbor! Fujita had advised warning Admiral Chuichi Nagumo about the unexpected spike in US Naval radio traffic, but Yamamoto reasoned that violating radio silence could give their position away and compromise the battle plans. So, Admiral Nagumo and his force of 4 fleet carriers would unknowingly be sailing into a trap set by Admiral Nimitz and his Pacific carrier task forces.

The rest we know as history! The Japanese carrier group consisting of the Hiryu, Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu would be sunk within less than two days into the battle though the US Pacific fleet carrier, Yorktown would be lost along with the first wave of US dive bombers and torpedo planes before more launches of the Douglass SBD Dauntless, and Grumman TBF Avengers descending upon 3 of the Japanese carriers in a few short minutes catching them with their air cover down and refueling and re-arming their bombers which crowded their decks as the Americans attacked! Only one carrier remained, the Japanese Fleet carriers the Soryu, Akaga, and Akagi would become burning wrecks as the US bombers dove on the Japanese. The following day, against the advice of his staff, Admiral Fletcher set out to hunt down the remaining Japanese carrier, the Hiryu, to finish off the Imperial task force.

Not enough can be said for the US Navy code breakers who deciphered the position of the incoming Japanese flotilla. Without this intelligence the US task Force under Rear Admiral Spruance would have had a difficult time locating his opponent who had superior numbers. The Japanese, over confident due to their string of prior victories even after the set back at the Battle of Coral Sea, had refused to accept that a US Carrier force would be waiting just northeast of Midway, and walked into a devastating trap that changed the course of the war in the Pacific. All of this finally admitted 10 years later in a book written by former Flight Leader, Mitsui Fujita in his book and in his own words.