Education deosn't necesserilly mean bettering yourself - A Right to Non-Existence?

See what the "bright" people in higher education establishments are coming up with ...

Can prospective children be said to have an interest that their parents not act in a way likely to lead to their birth when the parents are in a position to know that the life of the child, should it be born, would fall below some relevant threshold of well-being? (On the significance of the notion of a threshold level of well-being, see below, Sections 3 and 4). It is a widely held belief that under certain circumstances prospective parents should refrain from procreating owing to the predicted plight of the would-be child.

Since the publication of Narveson's seminal paper “Utilitarianism and New Generations” (Narveson 1967; see also Narveson 1973; Parfit 1976; Mulgan 2006, ch. 6), many have contributed to the debate on whether a person-affecting approach can account for the asymmetry of our procreational duties. The claimed asymmetry is the following: while prospective parents have no obligation to procreate out of regard for the interests of possible future children, they have an obligation not to beget children who are going to be miserable.

Some have argued that belief in such an asymmetry is incompatible with a person-affecting view and, more particularly, with the claim that possible people cannot be said to have, against us, a right to existence.[5] It is helpful at this point to make a distinction between the reasoning of potential parents that involves a possible future child and reasoning that involves their future child (see Govier 1979, 111). For instance, in deciding not to procreate at all people do not thereby harm the children they could have brought into existence (see sec. 2.1) since these are merely possible individuals. Thus, much reasoning about whether or not to have a child should concern the interests of those already alive; it is actual people's lives that would be affected by whether or not the child comes into existence (see Heyd 1992, 96-97). Nonetheless, people might make choices about procreation based on the welfare of their future child; that is, the welfare of that as yet non-existent individual would feature in their reasoning. When prospective parents decide in favor of having a child and now learn that this child, if born, would have a life that falls below a certain threshold of well-being they ought to consider the effects of their actions on their child and might well decide not to have a child after all.[6]

Objections to the asymmetry view presented above concern, in particular, the claim that after having made a decision to have children, prospective parents should revise their decision out of regard for their would-be child(ren) when they learn that the prospective child(ren) would have a life that falls below the relevant threshold. Why, under these circumstances, should parents revise their decision to have children out of regard for the children? The reason is that they would harm the would-be child, and, thus, arguably,[7] would act wrongly toward it. Here, harming their child-to-be would inflict a wrong on it. When prospective parents learn that their child would have a life that falls below the relevant threshold, they should refrain from having it, for by bringing the child into existence they would cause harm to it. In bringing about a child's existence they can harm this child.

This claim has been said to be incompatible with a person-affecting view (see Heyd 1992, 102, 105-06, 241-42). In Section 3, two notions of harm will be distinguished. The first relies on comparing a person's actual state to a counterfactual (or historical) state of the same person. The second relies on no such comparison. Both notions of harm require us to ask: for whom is the action worse? However, while both notions can be understood to reflect the person-affecting view as specified above (Section 1), only the first fulfills the stronger conditions of Parfit's “two-state requirement” or “better-or-worse-for-the-same-person” requirement: “we benefit or harm someone only if we cause him to be better or worse off than he would otherwise at that time have been” (Parfit 1984, 487). As will be shown in Section 3.2 below, in applying the second notion, we do not have to compare the value of life below some threshold with nonexistence in order to be able to claim that we can cause harm to a person by bringing about that person's existence.

Let us note that one can also defend the asymmetry of our procreational duties from an impersonal view, according to which the value of states of affairs is not reducible to how these states affect the interests of people. From an impersonal view one does not have to claim that prospective parents should refrain from procreation out of regard for the children they would have. Based on this view, two alternative interpretations of the asymmetry of our procreational duties have been discussed in the literature. One could adopt a version of negative consequentialism and argue that the universe would be better if present generations were guided by a criterion of right action that requires them to give priority to the prevention of suffering over the creation of good and happiness (see Heyd 1992, 59-60, for problems with this account). Alternatively, an impersonal approach could argue that we have a prima facie duty to promote over-all happiness by creating new well-off people — which duty, however, may be more easily overridden than duties not to cause harm. The paradoxical implications of the latter view have been prominently explored by Derek Parfit.

Stanford.edu

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